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Through the Looking Glass
The Self-Portrait of the Artist and the Re-Start of Animation
Originally, the self-portrait was a pictorial subgenre of portrayal, in which the artists became 
the model for their own paintings. However, it is also present in mediums such as cinema, when 
directors  appear  in  their  films,  from ephemeral  manifestations,  like  the  Hitchcockian  cameo 
performance, to the assumption of a protagonist role like Takeshi Kitano in  Takeshis’ (2005). 
Equally, the self-representation of animators establishes a privileged association between the artist 
and the animated film – a fabricated world that depends on its creator and demiurge. Moreover, 
self-representation  has  accompanied  key  moments  in  animation  history,  such  as  the  early 
endowment  of  comic  strip  characters  with  motion.  Here,  the  animated  self-caricature  of 
pioneering American animators is often apparent, and, in a more conteporary context, the advent 
of  CGI  has  established  new  relationships  between  authors  and  their  ‘creatures’  in  a  virtual 
environment.
The first self-portraits of animators, notably Winsor McCay in the live action scenes of Little  
Nemo (1911) and Gertie the Dinosaur (1914), helped to position the audience towards a new form 
of entertainment, as well as to consolidate the emerging profession of animator. Though these 
films were midway between comedy and documentary genres, the appearance of the draftsmen in 
their own films soon evolved to become a standardized representation, a stereotype for animated 
comedy, where the now fictional  author is embedded in the cartoon universe, as in the Fleisher 
Brothers’ series Out of the Inkwell (1921-1927) or Guido Manuli’s short film Solo un bacio (1983). 
More recently, the self-portrayal of animators has recovered autobiographical aspects, due to a 
renewed interest in animation as a means to express more serious concerns.
Despite excellent studies on interactivity, intertextuality and self-reflectivity in animation, such 
as  Lindvall  and  Melton’s  essay  “Towards  a  post-modern  animated  discourse:  Bakhtin, 
intertextuality  and  the  cartoon  carnival”  (1997),  the  self-portrayal  of  animators  is  under-
addressed in Animation Studies.  This article  will  consider the animated autoportrait  from an 
interdisciplinary  point  of  view,  relating  it  to  both  painting  and  literature.  Equally,  the 
relationships between animators and their own representations will be elucidated by considering 
self-portrayal in Jacques Derrida’s prominent essay  Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and  
Other Ruins (Mémoirs d’aveugle: L’autoportrait et autres ruines, 1990), in which he formulates the 
Abocular  Hypothesis;  that  is,  the  self-portrait  as  a  ghosted  image  between  artists  and  their 
reflection, or a falsification of the self, because artists cannot look directly at themselves while 
painting,  but  rather  to a  reduplicating  object  and remaining necessarily  blind for  themselves 
(1990, p. 44).
Following this premise, this paper will analyze three study cases that illustrate the progressive 
construction,  disarticulation, and  re-assembling of the author’s image in the history of animated 
film: Winsor McCay’s seminal self-representation of the animator in Little Nemo; Chris Landreth’s 
questioning of the fictional author at the emergence of 3-D animation in the end. (1995); and the 
restitution of personal concerns in the animator’s self-portrait, detached from the dialogue with 
Ryan Larkin in Chris Landreth’s Ryan (2004).
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1. The Early Making Of and the Paradigm of Author
If a portrait consists of the graphical depiction of a personality, looking for a physical and/or  
intellectual  resemblance,  the  self-portrait  embodies  another  dimension,  since  model  and 
portrayer are the same person. In opposition to commissioned works,  self-portrayal is  almost 
exclusively aimed at satisfying the artists’ wishes, representing the author’s explicit mood, or a 
demonstration of special skills. Therefore, autoportrayal has evolved enormously over the last five 
centuries,  according to the consideration of the artist’s  role  in society and their  autonomy as 
creators.
During  the  Renaissance,  painters  such  as  Durero  or  Hans  Holbein  used  to  portray  their 
customers from a professional point of view,  often introducing into the picture specific tools 
related to their career, or clothes that reflected their social status. These objects became the visual  
attributes of the portrayed person. For instance, a compass and a map would be the symbols for a 
navigator, but also for an astronomer, depending on the model’s clothes. Undoubtedly, such a 
rhetorical  resource  was  inherited from Classic  and Medieval  times,  when it  was  necessary  to 
characterize mythological  and religious  characters  through their  iconographical  attributes,  i.e. 
Hercules’ helmet made of a lion’s skin, or Saint Peter holding the keys to Heaven. Equally, the 
self-depiction of  painters  originated in  the Renaissance (and became consolidated during  the 
Baroque period) was conditioned by their professional view, resulting in a specific iconography, 
with the artist’s workshop as the background. This  resulted in the fashioning of an idealistic 
image of artists, who often appeared in the act of painting themselves at the easel, looking to the 
front as if they were studying their reflection on an imaginary mirror.
In the case of animators, their early self-portraits tended to exclude personal aspects to centre 
attention on their professional exercise, with the animation studio as the scenery and the making 
of  a  cartoon as the  main plot,  which generates  a  noticeable  self-reflectivity.  This  section will 
illustrate the  construction of  the professional  paradigm of  animators  at  the beginning of  the 
twentieth century, considering Winsor McCay’s movie  Winsor McCay, the Famous Cartoonist of  
the N.Y. Herald and His Moving Comics (1911) – best known as Little Nemo.
Nowadays,  Little  Nemo can  be  regarded  as  a  stylized  “Making  Of,”  or,  a  selective 
representation of animation making processes aimed to create even more fascination for the final 
product.  Winsor  McCay,  who  had  a  reputation  as  a  newspaper  cartoonist  and  as  vaudeville 
performer, becomes the protagonist of the live action footage that embraces, like a chrysalis, the 
mesmerizing final animation scenes.  Moving Comics, as the first title of the film proposes, is a 
pioneering definition for animation that established an inflexion point between press cartoons 
and this emerging art.
As someone must turn the camera’s handle, filmic self-portrait entails the fact that someone 
else must shoot the footage. In  Little Nemo, for example, live action scenes were filmed by J. 
Stuart Blackton. However,  McCay uses the camera as an object that duplicates his image, not 
unlike the painters forced to look at themselves on a mirror while painting their autoportraits. In 
both cases, the result is an idealistic construction or simulation. In Little Nemo, the scenery, the 
development of the plot and, above all, McCay’s self-presentation as an animator-and-gentleman, 
were specifically thought to legitimate animation as a precious, unique and skilful career.
Little Nemo is the tale of a challenge. The film starts with the following statement: “Winsor  
McCay  agrees  to  make  four  thousand  pen drawings  that  will  move,  one  month  from date.” 
Noticeably, it says, “drawings that will move”  – but not  characters that will become alive. The 
animator is not an alchemist, nor an obscure wizard, but rather a theatrical prestidigitator. McCay 
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plays the lead role, presenting himself as an artist able to draw large amounts of material, making 
it  evident  that  animation  is  a  time-intensive  activity  that  demands  patience  and  great  talent, 
though the results only last for a few seconds. From the beginning of the film, McCay makes it  
explicit  that  animation  is  a  demanding  task,  but  he  does  this  labour  elegantly,  quickly,  and 
apparently effortlessly. McCay works between jokes and bets, surrounded by other gentlemen in 
the club; in this scene, close-up shots focus on McCay rapidly drawing the four characters for the 
animated cartoon, because this exhibition of his skills as a draftsman is an essential part of the 
film audience’s entertainment, as in his own vaudeville show “The Seven Ages of Man” (1906).
After having demonstrated his gift for caricaturing, in the following scene McCay demonstrates 
his perseverance working at his studio. McCay does not only show himself  being, he also shows 
himself making, suggesting an allegory of animation: the animator seems absorbed by his labour, 
while  hundreds  of  drawings  are  piled  on  his  desk.  In  the  meantime,  several  workers  enter 
carrying  tons  of  paper  and  ink  barrels.  Those  hyperboles,  though  comical,  are  destined  to 
underline the effort required in the production of animation, which becomes an iconic image of 
animation production; a stereotype that, despite the use of new technologies, is still valid in a 
contemporary  context.  Other  comedic  situations  come  from  the  interaction  with  secondary 
characters, such as McCay’s young assistant, who wants to flip the drawings on the Mutoscope, a 
rotating  drum.  The  presence  of  technological  elements  like  this  testing  machine  or  the 
cinematographic  film  camera  in  the  following  scene  are  part  of  the  iconography  of  early 
animation,  as  much  as  the  easel  or  the  canvas  are  for  painting,  and is  aimed  at  getting  the 
audience familiarized with this new form of art.
Although the film is true to reality by exhibiting the development of animation production, the 
process  that  makes  drawings  move  (shooting  them with  a  camera)  actually  remains  hidden, 
increasing its mystery through a purposeful strategy of revealing-and-concealing animation tricks. 
After one month, the promised 4000 drawings are ready to be shot, but, instead of witnessing 
how animation is recorded, the audience will directly see the resultant film. The animated scene 
works here as a Derridean conjecture of pictures as a blind object that only exists for the eyes of 
the  viewer  (1990,  p.  63).  Since  McCay  deliberately  withholds  the  depiction  of  the  shooting 
process, the eyes of the audience figuratively replace the camera when they view the finished 
animated scene, metaphorically becoming the mould where the illusion of movement is forged.
However, this blind object – animation – results in a universe with noticeable autonomy, where 
characters enter the frame in genuine animated ways, by joining body pieces, or created from a 
myriad of floating lines; this is how the young Nemo appears on the screen. Furthermore, this 
environment shows a tendency towards self-reflectivity, echoing their author’s creative activity.  
Nemo, the most human-like character, holds a certain control over the other animation creatures 
in  the  diegetic  world,  squashing  and  stretching  them  like  reflections  in  a  distorting  mirror. 
Moreover, Nemo himself is an animator; he makes the Princess of Slumberland, come to life from 
the lines he has drawn onto the blank space, prefiguring a convention that would become central 
in the cartoon universe: simulations such as drawings, models or reflections can be eventually 
endowed with the anima – the spark of life – within the animated fiction.
McCay’s  self-representation  assimilates  two  traditions:  on  one  hand,  vaudeville’s  code  of 
appearing  with  theatrical  costume  is  aimed  “to  promote  the  illusion  that  the  animator  is  a 
magician” (Crafton, 1982, p. 57). On the other hand, when the film shows McCay working at his  
studio,  it  anticipates  the  future  symbolic  image  of  animators,  who  will  generally  appear 
developing their creative tasks. No personal effects are depicted in this autoportrait, save those 
pertaining to his career exercise and to his excellence in the development of his art, making the 
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film a piece of self-advertising. Ultimately, Little Nemo cannot be categorized in a middle position 
between documentary and fantasy film, since it generates something new, an unexpected product 
detached from Baudrillard’s evil seduction of images: the truth absorbing the potency of falseness 
produces  the  simulation (1983,  p.  7),  in  this  case,  a  false  documentary,  or,  more  properly,  a 
documentary fable.
2. The Animated Animator and the Death of the Author
Although  the  interaction  between  creators  and  their  animated  characters  soon  became 
stereotypical in the cartoon world, though often relegated to the position of absurd comedies, the 
presence of authors in their own films generally hints to a sort of Metaphysics (of Comedy), since  
thinking about creators of fiction can be a metaphor of thinking about our own ‘Creators;’ the  
philosophical and even religious dimensions are inherent to this cliché. The interaction of the 
draftsman with his creatures parodies the relation between God and human beings, as well as 
legendary  human  creations  like  the  Golem,  or  pseudo-scientific  attempts  like  Paracelsus’ 
Homunculus, were degraded images of the Divine Creation. As in those myths, the re-animated 
being would immediately start a rivalry with his animator, not unlike Dr. Frankenstein’s creature, 
demanding dignity and autonomy from the Modern Prometheus.
The  animated  cartoon  has  echoed  this  Promethean  conflict  between  creatures  and  their 
authors. For instance, Ko-ko the Clown continually mocks director Max Fleisher in the Out of the  
Inkwell series,  blurring the  limits  between the  real  and the imaginary.  Animation becomes  a 
heterogeneous, hyperreal1 space wherein the self-representation of cartoonists is, in Derridean 
terms, emerging from a frame, and within the frame (1990, p. 92), like the hand of the animator in 
films such as  La Sexilinea (Osvaldo Cavaldoni, 1977) or  Manipulation (Daniel  Greaves, 1991). 
Moreover, the presence of  animated animators in their own fictional universe transforms them 
into fictional authors,  alienated from the  real author. Ultimately, the self-portrait of animators 
does not vindicate their demiurge-like supremacy of creators, but rather exposes their limitations, 
especially  when  they  are  scorned  by  their  creatures.  In  this  way,  it  can  be  said  that  the 
questionability of authors – or, as expressed by Barthes, their death – is the ironic consequence of 
authors’ self-consciousness during the twentieth century.
Furthermore, the animated animators precede the advent of the hyperreal from the beginning 
of that century, indeed, from the beginning of film animation. As Alan Cholodenko appreciates, 
“insofar as animation has to do with endowing with life and with motion, it bears a privileged 
relation to the beginning” (2000, p. 9). This way, the fantasy of the beginning, or rather re the  
reanimation of an existing situation, is inseparable from the notion of authorship, resulting in the 
periodical return of animation to self-reflective aspects.
Let us return to a literary precedent that demonstrates the astonishing balance between the 
early twentieth century and its end. Many decades before features such as  The Truman Show 
(Peter Weir, 1998) or Stranger Than Fiction (Marc Foster, 2006) were filmed, the Spanish writer 
Miguel de Unamuno published his most disrupting book, the meta-novel Mist (Niebla, 1914). Its 
open-structured narration attempted to create a new genre, called  nivola, where philosophical 
reflection  prevailed  over  narration,  pointing  to  the  limits  of  fiction  instead  of  hiding  its 
framework. The book relates how Augusto Pérez acquires a consciousness of reality through a 
series  of  unfavourable  experiences.  When,  after  a  humiliating  mismatch,  he  decides  to  kill 
1 In the opinion of Jean Baudrillard, the real does not vanishes to favor the imaginary, but rather to increase the “more real than the real: the  
hyperreal”. Equally, simulation is “truer than the truth” (1983, p. 9).
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himself, he travels to Salamanca to meet his admired writer – no other than Miguel de Unamuno 
himself  – to ask him why he should continue to live. The writer replies as follows (Unamuno, 
1914: 261):
– Well; dear Augusto, the truth is  – I said to him using my sweetest voice –, that you cannot kill yourself 
because you are not alive, and that you are neither alive nor dead because you don’t exist…
– That I don’t exist? – he cried.
– No, you just exist as a fictional being; poor Augusto, you are nothing but a product from my fantasy and 
those of my readers that read the tale of your pretended adventures and misfortunes, as I have written them;  
you’re nothing but the character from a novel, or a nivola, or however you wish to call it. Now you know 
your secret. (trans. a.)
At the climax, the fictional character demands to rule his own destiny, or, in other words, be the 
author of his own ending. When Augusto returns home, he submits to an absurd death, killing 
himself  by eating too much. The reader cannot discern if his  passing away was accidental or 
purposely executed; moreover, Unamuno does not cast any light on this mystery, since he is just  
another character from the book, spreading even more confusion about the novel’s outcome.
Anticipating Roland Barthes’ conclusions in “Death of the Author,” Unamuno’s dialogue with 
Augusto points  to a third maker:  “those of  my readers  that read the tale  of your pretended 
adventures” (1914, p. 261). Nonetheless, this ultimate ‘shaper’ is not the reader as an individual  
(as the writer is) but always a group because their multiple, divided, multiform fantasy has made  
Augusto  true.  For  Unamuno,  fictional  beings  acquired  a  life  of  their  own,  not  unlike  Don 
Quixote and Sancho Panza when they get incorporated into the collective imagination: “The 
dream of only one person is the illusion, the appearance; the dream of two people is the truth, the 
reality” (ibidem, p. 210).
When authors do not appear more consistent than their own characters, not only the fictional 
universe appears as questionable, but also the author’s sphere, which becomes obviously fictional. 
Augusto dares to question (the fictional)  Unamuno:  why should his  own existence be put  in 
doubt, if his perception of reality is as strong as the writer’s? The self-portrait of the author, or,  
the reproducibility of the author as a written line, a graph, a trace, constitutes a double that steals 
authority,  autonomy,  authenticity to  authors.  The  animated  animator is  another  Golem,  an 
automaton created for a hilarious inversion of terms: the mechanization of fiction, the exposure 
of the narrative trace that inescapably inverts the borders of reality as a maleficent mirror: the 
fictionalization of reality.
Due to the flourishing of CGI, the last fin de siècle has witnessed an extraordinary re-start of 
animation  as  an  expressive  means.  The  animation  industry  has  been  expanded  to  include 
unexpected fields, uses and applications, thanks to its ability for simulation. Digital technology 
also involves a new form of thinking, by which the multiplicity of interfaces, the reversibility of 
facts, and the interactivity between user and software prevails. But, above all, the hyperreality – 
“more real than the real” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 9) of 3D CGI animation has re-activated the  
fictionalization of reality that remained latent in Western culture since Mist.
The eventual appearance of a fictional animator becomes the turning point of a CGI film such 
as Chris Landreth’s the end. (1995). Being its author’s debut, this open-structured film is focused 
on the making of the film itself, featuring a meta-filmic dialogue between two astounding CGI 
creatures and the voice of their animator, whom they initially mistake for God. the end. is divided 
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into two parts; the first takes place in a fictional CG space where two cyber-dancers execute a 
convoluted choreography, sprinkled with intricate metaphors and dislocated dialogue, obscure 
and empty. This embodies a caricature of postmodern contemporary art, particularly of some 
computer animation pieces created in the 1980s and early 90s, which, for Chris Landreth, “were 
often very abstract and obtuse pieces of computer art” (Landreth, 2005). Then, mimicking the 
theatre, the lighting on the stage switches off and the performance stops. The characters stare at 
one another,  wondering  what  to  say  next,  until  they  hear  the  voice  of  the  animator,  “Am I  
hallucinating or did we just invent God?” says one of them recalling Duffy Duck’s interaction 
with the invisible animator in  Duck Amuck (Chuck Jones, 1955). But, unlike  Duck Amuck, the 
characters will  progressively question the animator’s  authority initially hinting at the arbitrary 
mise-en-scène and its symbolism. The animator replies, “I have to make these metaphors obscure 
so  that  the  audience  will  spend  lots  of  time  analyzing  them.”  Later,  they  point  to  the 
meaninglessness of the film’s discourse; and finally, they not only deny their fictional origin but, 
since they are aware of themselves and of their own memories, they suggest the possibility of the 
author belonging to  their imagination in a way that almost reproduces word for word Augusto 
Pérez’s reply to Unamuno.
The second part takes place at the animator’s studio, when a camera movement brings us from 
the previously represented stage, to the vignettes of a storyboard at the animator’s desk. However, 
this universe is also a CG environment, and the animator is equally a CG character, though more 
realistically depicted than his animated characters. The nameless animated animator has features 
vaguely recalling Landreth’s,2 and is talking on the phone, explaining his project to someone else. 
He ponders different endings of the story, although the voice on the phone rejects the proposals. 
Then, the relationship between creature and creator re-starts in a circular fashion. The voice on 
the phone takes control, suggesting that  he should be part of the film’s outcome. He protests, 
“That’s a lame idea!” while the words from the phone immediately take effect like a magic spell, 
altering the animated animator’s physical appearance, changing his race, age and gender, until  
s/he  acquires  awareness  of  him/herself  as  the  origin  of  his/her  own ending,  reconciling  this 
animator with the CG creatures’ aspirations. If these characters had invented God, the last words 
of the animator, by then transformed into an Indian girl) are: “As a work of my own fiction, I can  
create my own ending.”
On one hand, the mutability of the animated animator, and on the other hand, the invisibility 
of  the  authentic  demiurge  as  represented by the  voice  on  the  phone,  proves  the  validity  of 
Barthes’ theory. While the author has existed as a cultural construction, the product of a period, 
of a class, of a gender, of aspirations that are socially determined, as manifest in McCay’s self-
portrait, authors have been mediums that focus many voices, references and traditions, keeping 
only the power of mixing them. It is the language who speaks, and not the author; it is animation, 
and not the animator, that decides its own ending.
3. The Self-Portrait as a Confession. Animated Documentary and the Portraits of the Ruin
The construction of a professional paradigm for animators, as well as their incarnation in their  
own  films  –  their  “incartoonation,”  as  Lindvall  and  Melton  highlight  (1997,  p.  214),  has 
assembled a sort of stereotypical portrait: a universal representation of artists that share the same 
creative concerns, but not their issues as individuals. Most of these self-conscious images respond 
to a scarcely personal, rather stylized image, giving as a result a skewed autoportrait.
2 To further underline the status of this animated animator as the author’s alter ego, Chris Landreth purposely made him left-handed, he dubbed  
his own voice, and the number of Perrier water bottles onto his desk prove that the character is as much a teetotaler as Landreth himself.
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However, animators can also produce their individualized self-portraits with the participation 
of a second figure: a partner or an interviewer as a “Socratic midwife” helping authors to give 
birth to their memories. Ironically, this indirect reflection of animators on their conversational 
partners enables a field for private confidences shifting attention to self-biographical aspects, as, 
for instance, the pioneering sample of Caroline Leaf and Veronica Soul in their film  Interview 
(1977). Rimbaud’s aphorism, “Me is another one,” has never been more applicable than in this 
semi-documental  tendency  in  animation,  taking  the  form of  a  fruitful  dialogue  between two 
artists.
Extrapolating from Baudrillard, animated documentaries come from two opposite focuses: the 
potency of falseness, and the potency of truth. There is no balance between them, but rather a 
mutual radicalization. If a  false documentary is the consequence of truth absorbing the force of 
falseness, now falseness soaks the properties of truth, giving as a result true fiction, a metaphor of 
reality  where  emotions,  hopes  and  conflicts  purposely  generate  metamorphosis  on  both 
characters’ and scenery – paradoxically, a non-objective representation that serves better for self-
biographical and documentary purposes.
One  of  the  most  audacious  films  of  this  decade,  Ryan (Chris  Landreth,  2004),  perfectly 
illustrates this tendency. Chris Landreth develops what he denominates as ‘psycho-realism’, an 
Expressionist view that gets inside psychical and spiritual aspects by spectacularly distorting the 
physical features of animated (real) characters. From the opening of the film, the director justifies 
this unconventional mise-en-scène by penetrating through a looking glass, which transforms the 
world  of  appearances.  Landreth’s  initially  hyperrealistic  self-portrait  enters  a  strange,  uneasy 
world  where  personal  wounds are  displayed on the  skin’s  surface.  There,  he will  meet  Ryan 
Larkin, an artist that decades ago decided to quit animating. Now he collects coins from the  
people in the street and spends his time at a shelter for indigents.3 While Landreth’s appearance is 
lightly degraded, Larkin’s features are terribly eroded – his head appears half-consumed, and only 
one eye, barely supporting a pair of glasses, can stare at the interviewer.
The film is conducted as a series of encounters with the living myth, a former rising star from 
the National Film Board of Canada, until he was waylaid by depression and cocaine addiction.  
Landreth also gathers testimonies from Larkin’s acquaintances. However, the film progressively 
involves Landreth’s personal regrets alongside his vision of Larkin, becoming his unexpected alter 
ego.
Ryan contains  two animated self-portraits:  a  hand-drawn youthful  picture  of  Ryan Larkin 
taken  from  his  film  Walking (1968),  and  obviously  Landreth’s  CG  version  of  himself.  As  a 
biographic portrayal,  Ryan includes fragments from Larkin’s filmography, stressing the intimate 
connection between the animator’s unconventional lifestyle and his distinguishable visual style 
after 1968. Larkin’s animated self-portrait, visionary although melancholic, exemplifies his desires 
of innovation; his silhouette blinks with vibrant colours, while his legs are strangely enlarged, as 
in a hallucination. Larkin’s walking figure appears at the start and at the end of his own film like a  
conscious  signature.  Nowadays,  Walking can  be  regarded  as  the  animator’s  statement  of 
principles addressed to disrupt filmmaking principles, giving prevalence to animation as a visual  
joy – a psychedelic experience and pleasure, beyond the requirements of storytelling. Since they 
provide something essentially different to life, animation and drugs became akin, due to their 
potency to stimulate imagination.
3 Though Ryan Larkin died in 2007, I prefer to refer the film by using present tense.
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Nevertheless, when the filmmaker is torn between such two energy-consuming addictions, one 
of them eventually overcomes the other. When any work of art becomes a great passion, it may 
vampirize its creator, because it  drains blood.4 His producer at the NFB, Derek Lamb, declares 
during his interview for Landreth’s film: “From the first flush of addiction he produced some 
amazing work. A life can be spent really trying to get that moment back” (Landreth, 2004). The 
originality of Larkin’s work was arguably related to his innate talent, as to his amazing view on 
living things stimulated by drugs, which shone for the last time in Street Music (1972).
Larkin exemplifies all those artists that one day renounced creating artwork; those authors that 
suddenly said, “I’d prefer not,” as in Melville’s famous tale, Bartleby the Scrivener (1853). If there 
is an inherent guilt in the process of creation, this concerns to a capricious God, as Lars Von Trier 
suggests in his filmic self-portrait Epidemic (1987). The author develops his work at the expense 
of other people’s suffering, the fictional characters experience the effects of a plague. Therefore,  
the  act  of  creating  remains  eternally  blameworthy;  it  is  not  Adam,  but  rather  God,  who  is 
responsible for the Original Sin.  Only a  self-portrait  as  re-trait of  oneself,  as  self-withdrawal, 
makes artists sublimate their fault.
During their filmic interview, Landreth advices Larkin that he should beat beer – one of the 
few pleasures still available for Larkin – as he did with cocaine. Landreth continues, “I want to 
see you thrive,” as if Larkin desired to join an animation studio again. Landreth’s unfortunate 
observation starts a chain reaction that finalizes with Larkin’s catharsis, destroying more of his 
already-corroded  features.  After  this  embarrassing  episode,  Landreth  delineates  with  more 
accuracy his own self-portrait, confessing to the audience his most terrible memory that brought 
him to say those words – his mother’s death from alcoholism when he was two. Landreth’s guilt 
and confession recalls Derrida’s observation on self-portraits: “In Christian culture there is no 
self-portrait without confession [...]. The self-portraitist thus does not lead one to knowledge, he 
admits a fault and asks for forgiveness” (1990, p. 117). Only after his confrontation with Larkin  
can Landreth see clearly; despite his poverty, Larkin has never lost his dignity. Although Larkin is  
the  mirror  in  which no one wants  to be reflected,  his  attitude  in  facing  adversity  eventually 
represents for Landreth a model for resilience and growth.
Larkin’s legend is endowed with an irresistible fascination because he died after having been 
successful. Then comes the enigmatic ending to the film: while Larkin asks passersby for some 
small  change,  Landreth  greets  Larkin  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  street.  Landreth’s  self-
representation has evolved as a metaphor of his own learning process; his features appear almost 
as destroyed as Larkin’s, although his face reflects deep pride. He stares with one eye, raising his  
hand to Ryan, a moving scene that for me recalls the following lines by Derrida (1990, p. 127):
One can see with a single eye, at a single glance, whether one has one eye or two. One can lose or gouge out 
an eye without ceasing to see, and one can still wink with a single eye.
Thus, even in misfortune, we can receive nice surprises from ourselves.
Conclusions: The Blind Eye of Animators
There is no self-portrait. It is the world which, through the image, produces its own self-portrait and we are  
allowed there only out of kindness (but the pleasure is shared).
4 Ryan Larkin’s vital experience is noticeably similar to another fallen angel’s: the Spanish animator and filmmaker Iván Zulueta (1943-2009). His  
cult movie Arrebato (1980) suggests the same personal fight between two addictions, filmmaking and heroine, being finally seduced by the most  
destructive one: the film, which devours its own creator.
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The  self-portrait  of  animators  ultimately  constitutes  an  (im)possibility  which  is  at  times 
controversial, and is formulated necessarily as a conjecture  – and must never be confused with 
‘the real’. Self-perception depends on multiple subjective factors such as the person’s momentary 
mood,  opinion,  self-esteem and private  circumstances.  Consequently,  for  artists,  their  identity 
becomes one of the most animated entities, as movable and unstable as memory.
Moreover, visual self-representation is conditioned by duplicating objects that allow artists to 
study  themselves,  or  to  be  transferred into  celluloid,  like  the  cinematographic  camera.  Like 
painters, we use mirrors to see what we cannot look at directly – for instance, ourselves, or the 
eyes of Medusa. Equally, the shadow offers an indirect representation, the blind outline of the 
self, as in Georges Schwizgebel’s photographic film Nakounine (1986), in which he captures his 
own shade on the asphalt.  The reflection on the mirror,  the shadow, the silhouette,  even the  
cinematographic  double  are  simulations  that  to  produce  a  spectral  image,  a  seductive 
representation that somehow prefigures the death of the model, like the mythological Narcissus, 
who dies when he falls in love with his reflection, his (evil) simulation.
Although the notion of authorship is joined to the origins of animation film making, the self-
representation of authors also evokes their death as well as the crisis of the artistic medium, which  
announces a future re-animation. Ultimately, the self-portraits of animators adopting the form of 
the  interview,  replacing  the  mirror  by  the  dialectic  with  ‘the  other,’  imply  a  new Derridean 
hypothesis, another form of blindness that uses introspection instead of sight in a way that recalls  
the clairvoyance of the blind oracle Tiresias: a blindness that turns to the insights or, like for 
Derrida, “the blindness that opens the eye,” which is not the one that darkens vision (1990, p. 
126-127).
The animated self-portrait detached from the dialogue between two artists is today a successful  
trope, enjoyed by a large audience thanks to the development of self-biographical features like 
Marjane Satrapi’s and Vincent Paronnaud’s Persepolis (2007). This is an adaptation of the female 
director’s autobiographical graphic novel, appreciably counterpointed by the male co-director. 
This  is  also  the  case  in  Ari  Folman’s  Waltz  with  Bashir  (Vals  im Bashir,  2008),  in  which the 
memories of the protagonist – the director of the film – are re-built by assembling pieces of other 
war veterans.  Despite  their  approach to reality,  the inescapable consequence of the animated 
autoportraits and autobiographies is the fictionalization of the author’s identity – as the image of 
the world, like in Baudrillard’s assertion, is inevitably fictional. 
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